IPC2BNSConverter

BNS Section 51 · Deep dive

BNS Section 51: When the Abettor's Plan Goes Sideways

BNS Section 51 deals with the abettor whose plan goes sideways: where an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act actually done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it. That liability is conditional, and the proviso imposes two cumulative requirements joined by 'and' - the act done must have been a probable consequence of the abetment, and it must have been committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment. Illustration (b) is the one worth remembering because it refuses liability: a theft committed during an abetted arson was 'a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning', so opportunity is not consequence and liability is parcelled out act by act. Section 51 fixes no punishment of its own. It is distinct from Section 50, which applies where the same act was done with a different state of mind and needs no proviso. The operative sentence is unchanged from IPC Section 111 and the proviso differs by the single word 'that'. No judgment applying, interpreting or even citing Section 51 under the Sanhita was located.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 9 October 2026 23 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 51 — Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done
Earlier law (IPC)
Section 111 — Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done · substantively unchanged
Side-by-side converterIPC 111 → BNS 51

What the section says

Section 51 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 carries the marginal-note title Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done. and reads in full: S1S2

51. When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it:

Provided that the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.

Illustrations.

(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if the child was acting under the influence of A's instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the child to put the poison into the food of Y.

(b) A instigates B to burn Z's house, B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning.

(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C break into the house, and being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is liable to the punishment provided for murder.

(A note on the text. The India Code extraction renders the illustrations heading as "llustrations." without its initial letter. The Gazette text published by the Ministry of Home Affairs reads "Illustrations." and that is the form reproduced above. This is the second section in this chapter carrying exactly that extraction defect. Section 49 is the other. The defect is in the extraction, not in the statute. S1S2)

The question Section 51 answers

Sections 45 to 50 all assume the abettor got, more or less, what he asked for. Section 51 deals with the case where he did not: the act done is a different act from the one abetted. A tells B to burn a house; B burns it and also steals. A gives a child poison meant for Z; the child poisons Y by mistake. A sends two men to rob a house; they kill the householder who resists.

The section's answer is a conditional yes. The abettor is liable for the act actually done, "in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it", but only if the proviso is satisfied.

The proviso has two cumulative conditions, not one

This is where Section 51 is most often read too loosely. The proviso requires that the act done:

  1. was a probable consequence of the abetment; and
  2. was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.

The word joining them is "and", not "or". Both must hold. The first is an objective question about how foreseeable the act done was; the second is a causal question linking the act done back to the particular form of abetment that occurred, and it tracks the three limbs of abetment in Section 45, which are instigation, conspiracy and intentional aid. S1

Illustration (a) shows both conditions being tested expressly rather than assumed: A is liable "if the child was acting under the influence of A's instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment". The illustration is written in conditional form precisely because neither condition is automatic.

Illustration (b) is the one to remember

Illustrations (a) and (c) impose liability. Illustration (b) refuses it, and it is the more useful of the three because it marks the boundary.

B does exactly what he was told, he burns the house, and also commits a theft while there. On those facts A "is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning". S1

Two points follow. First, an act that merely happens at the same time and place as the abetted act is not thereby a probable consequence of it. Opportunity is not consequence. Second, the illustration confirms that Section 51 does not sweep the abettor into everything the doer did on the occasion: A remains "guilty of abetting the burning of the house". Liability is parcelled out act by act.

Illustration (c) sits on the other side of the same line. Men sent to burgle a house at midnight, armed, who kill an inmate who resists. There the killing may well be the probable consequence of what was abetted, and the illustration says A is then "liable to the punishment provided for murder". The contrast between (b) and (c) is the contrast between an act that merely occurred during the enterprise and an act that flowed from its nature.

How Section 51 differs from Section 50

The two neighbours are frequently confused, and the dividing line is clean. S1

What divergedGoverning provisionQualifying condition
Same act, different state of mindthe mens reaSection 50none. The abettor is simply measured by his own intention
A different act altogetherthe conductSection 51the proviso: probable consequence and caused by the abetment

Section 50 needs no proviso because the act is the one the abettor asked for; only the mental element moved, so his own intention can safely supply the measure. Section 51 needs one because the conduct itself has changed, and without a limit the abettor would answer for whatever the doer chose to do. Section 50 is analysed in its own article in this collection; Sections 49, 52 and 53 are not analysed here.

A structural point: why Section 51 is missing from the Section 2(24)(a) list

Section 2(24) gives "offence" the narrow meaning of "a thing made punishable by this Sanhita" except in the Chapters and sections listed in its sub-clauses, and sub-clause (a) widens it for a named list to include things punishable under any special or local law. S1

Running the numbers 49 to 61 against that list one by one produces a tidy result. Every one of them is listed except Sections 51 and 53. And those two are precisely the only ones in that range whose text never uses the word "offence" at all. Section 51 speaks throughout of an "act" being abetted and a "different act" being done; Section 53 is about "an effect caused by act abetted". Every other provision from 49 to 61 uses "offence", and every one of them is on the list. S1

So the omission is not a gap. There is no "offence" in Sections 51 and 53 for the widening to operate on. Those sections attribute liability for acts and effects, leaving the question of what offence that liability amounts to, and therefore the meaning of "offence", to the provision under which the abettor is finally punished. (The correlation is a verified fact; the explanation offered for it is the author's analysis, and no legislative material on the point was located.)

One consequence worth stating plainly: like Sections 45 to 48, Section 51 fixes no punishment. It says the abettor is liable "in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted" the act done, which routes the question back to whichever punishment provision then applies. Illustration (c) shows the mechanism, referring to A being "liable to the punishment provided for murder" rather than to any term in Section 51 itself.

What changed from IPC Section 111

Almost nothing, and what did change is a single word.

The operative sentence is identical. The proviso is identical except that the Sanhita reads "Provided that the act done was a probable consequence …" where the Penal Code read "Provided the act done was …". Both forms were confirmed from the primary texts: the Gazette for the Sanhita, India Code for the Penal Code. S1S4 The addition of "that" is a drafting tidy-up of a kind found throughout the Sanhita; it changes no condition and removes no requirement.

All three illustrations are carried over, in the same order and with the same labels (a), (b) and (c). Their substance is unchanged. Two punctuation differences appear between the two printed texts: the Sanhita has a comma in illustration (a) at "Here, if the child" where the India Code text of Section 111 has none, and a comma in illustration (b) at "burn Z's house, B sets fire" where the India Code text again has none. S1S4 I cannot tell from these sources whether those commas were added by the Sanhita's drafters or dropped by the India Code extraction of the Penal Code, and the point is recorded rather than resolved. Nothing turns on it either way.

The marginal-note titles are identical save for the Sanhita's closing full stop.

Classification for this collection: renumbered and substantively unchanged, with one word added to the proviso. Anyone presenting Section 51 as a change in the law of abettor's liability has misread it.

Case law

Searches were run on Indian Kanoon, a judgment-text repository, not on official court portals.

Under the Sanhita the result is a genuine nil. A phrase search for "section 51 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" returned no results: the retrieved page carries the literal text "No matching results" and contains zero result entries. S9 The negative was tested by retrieving the page itself, because the search tool returned an ambiguous count. No judgment applying, interpreting or even citing BNS Section 51 was located.

A search on the section's distinctive opening words, "When an act is abetted and a different act is done", returned 20 results, all of which were examined through their listings and snippets; two were retrieved in full. S9 They are predominantly Penal Code material, which remains directly relevant because the operative sentence is unchanged.

In Shrawan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 3716/2022, 6 January 2023, Pushpendra Singh Bhati J.) the Court set out IPC Section 111 in full, including its proviso, in the course of a discussion of the abetment provisions, and went on to observe of Section 107 that "an act of abetment may take place in one of the three ways; namely, instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid" and that "It thus requires the commission of positive act". S7 The reproduction is an accurate one; the passage is a statement of the statutory scheme rather than an application of Section 111 to the facts, and it is used here only for that.

In Sunilkumar v. The State of Karnataka (High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, Criminal Petition No. 201695 of 2023 with Criminal Petition No. 201313 of 2024, 14 August 2026, H.P. Sandesh J.) the Court, in a passage summarising the abetment provisions while relying on a Supreme Court decision, recorded that "Section 111 deals with the liability of the abettor when one act was abetted, and a different act was done". S8 That is a descriptive restatement of the provision, not an application of it; the case concerned IPC Sections 494 and 495, and the surrounding discussion is about what must be established for abetment of those offences. The Supreme Court decision the Court relied on, which that order names as Sumer Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan: was not retrieved or read, and the order's citation of its date is itself incomplete in the retrieved text. Nothing in this article rests on it.

So no decision turning on the Section 51 proviso was located, and in particular none was found testing where the line drawn by illustration (b) falls in a contested case. The illustrations themselves remain the best available guide.

Worked examples

All of the following are hypothetical illustrations written for this article, not decided cases. Each turns on one limb of the proviso.

1. Both conditions met: liability. A instigates B to throw acid at C. B throws it, misses C and disfigures D standing beside him. The act done differs from the act abetted, but injury to a bystander is a probable consequence of throwing acid in a crowd and it happened under the influence of A's instigation. Section 51 makes A liable for the act done. This is illustration (a)'s structure with different facts.

2. Probable, but not caused by the abetment: no liability. A instigates B to assault C. Two months later, after the two have fallen out and A has withdrawn, B assaults C in a private quarrel of his own. The second limb fails: the act was not committed under the influence of the instigation. Foreseeability alone does not satisfy the proviso.

3. Caused by the abetment, but not a probable consequence: no liability. A asks B to deliver a threatening letter to C. While at C's premises B steals a watch he happens to see. The theft was occasioned by the errand but is a distinct act, not a probable consequence of delivering a letter. This is illustration (b)'s reasoning: opportunity is not consequence.

4. Liability is parcelled out, not all-or-nothing. On the facts of example 3, A remains liable for abetting whatever offence the threatening letter constitutes. Failing the proviso as to the theft does not disturb that.

5. Not Section 51 at all: same act, different intention. A tells B to frighten C; B does exactly that but, unknown to A, intending to extort money. The act is the one abetted; only the state of mind differs. Section 50 governs, and Section 51's proviso never arises.

6. Not Section 51 at all: the abetted act simply happened. A tells B to commit theft and B commits that theft. Nothing diverged. Section 49 supplies the punishment.

Common misconceptions

Each is explained above; this is a quick check, not a second explanation.

MisconceptionWhy it is wrong
"An abettor answers for everything the doer did on the occasion."Illustration (b) says the opposite: the theft committed during the abetted arson was "a distinct act" and A was "not guilty of abetting the theft". S1
"The proviso is satisfied if the act done was foreseeable."Foreseeability is only the first condition. The act must also have been committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy. The two are joined by "and". S1
"Section 51 covers the accomplice who goes further than intended."If the act is the one abetted and only the intention differs, that is Section 50. Section 51 is for a different act. S1
"Section 51 prescribes a punishment."It fixes none. It makes the abettor liable "as if he had directly abetted" the act done, and the punishment comes from elsewhere, as illustration (c) shows by referring to "the punishment provided for murder". S1
"The BNS tightened or loosened the abettor's liability here."The operative sentence is identical and the proviso differs by the single word "that". S1S4
"Section 51 is missing from the Section 2(24)(a) list by oversight."Sections 51 and 53 are the only provisions in the range 49 to 61 that never use the word "offence", so there is nothing for the widening to operate on. S1

Temporal application

The Sanhita came into force on 1 July 2024, appointed by Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II: Section 3: Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353), for all provisions except sub-section (2) of Section 106. Section 51 was not excepted and commenced on 1 July 2024. S3

Abetment before that date is governed by IPC Section 111. Because the operative sentence and the two conditions of the proviso are unchanged, the ingredients do not differ according to which code applies, but the correct provision must still be cited, and Article 20(1) of the Constitution forbids conviction for an act that was not an offence under a law in force when it was committed. Penal Code decisions on Section 111 remain directly usable and should be cited as such, not as decisions on the Sanhita.

What this article does not cover

The statutory analysis rests on the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs and on India Code; on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as published on India Code; on the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 for the numbering collision only; and on the commencement notification. S1S2S3S4S5S6 The operative sentence and proviso were compared with IPC Section 111 by word-level diff, and the "Provided that" / "Provided" difference was confirmed from both primary texts. Section 2(24)(a) membership was checked for each of Sections 49 to 61 individually.

Sections 45 to 50 and 52 to 62 are not analysed. Section 45 is referred to only for the three limbs of abetment; Section 49 only as the provision that applies when nothing diverged; Section 50 only to mark the mens-rea / conduct distinction, and it has its own article; Section 53 only for the structural point about the Section 2(24)(a) list, and its own content is not examined. Sentencing practice was not researched, and because Section 51 fixes no punishment, nothing here indicates what any abettor would receive.

Procedural matters were not researched. Cognizability, bailability, the trial court, compounding and limitation were not researched for Section 51, and no procedural classification should be inferred. A numbering collision exists and is noted only as a search hazard: BNSS Section 51 concerns examination of an arrested person by a medical practitioner and BSA Section 51 concerns facts judicially noticeable, so an abbreviated reference to "Section 51 of the BNS" may mean one of those. Neither is analysed. S5S6

No legislative material on Section 51 was located, and none is needed for the substance: the provision is unchanged. No rationale for adding "that" to the proviso was found, and none is claimed.

Judicial authority is thin and is described as such. No judgment applying, interpreting or citing BNS Section 51 was located, and the nil result was verified by retrieving the search page itself. S9 Shrawan Singh reproduces IPC Section 111 and states the scheme of Section 107; it does not apply Section 111 to its facts. S7 Sunilkumar contains a one-line descriptive restatement of Section 111 within a passage relying on a Supreme Court decision; it is not an application, the case concerned IPC Sections 494 and 495, and the Supreme Court decision it relied on: named there as Sumer Kanwar v. State of Rajasthan: was not retrieved or read, its date being incompletely reported in the retrieved text. S8 Of the 20 results for the distinctive-wording search, all were examined through listings and snippets and two were retrieved in full; the remainder were not read, and no proposition here rests on them. S9 Both retrieved judgments were read from a judgment-text repository rather than official court portals; the official reports were not consulted, and later treatment was not researched.

Source defects recorded. The India Code extraction of Section 51 renders "Illustrations." as "llustrations.": the same defect found at Section 49: and the Gazette form is used here. S1S2 The India Code text of IPC Section 111 lacks commas at two points in illustrations (a) and (b) where the Sanhita's text has them; whether those commas were added by the Sanhita or dropped in the extraction of the Penal Code cannot be determined from these sources and the difference is immaterial. S4

One typographic normalisation, applied throughout this collection. The official texts use the typographic apostrophe (as in "A’s instigation"); the quoted statutory text in this article, like the rest of the collection, uses the plain apostrophe ("A's"). Nothing but the character is changed, but it is recorded because a character-exact comparison against the official text will register the difference.

Labelled as the author's analysis: the explanation of why Sections 51 and 53 are absent from the Section 2(24)(a) list; the proposition that opportunity is not consequence; and the reading of the proviso's two conditions as cumulative and separately testable. The last follows from the word "and" and from the conditional form of illustration (a), but no decision construing the proviso was located.

This article is for education and general information. It is AI-assisted and has not been reviewed, verified or approved by a lawyer. It is not legal advice and must not be relied on for any actual case. What act was abetted, what act was in fact done, whether the one was a probable consequence of the other, and whether it was committed under the influence of the abetment are all findings of fact that only a court can make on the evidence before it, and no outcome in any case is guaranteed. Verify the current position and take advice from a qualified advocate before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 51 do?
It addresses the case where the abettor did not get what he asked for: 'When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it.' That liability is then cut down by a proviso. Sections 45 to 50 all assume the abettor got, more or less, what he asked for; Section 51 is the provision for when the plan goes sideways. S1
+What exactly does the proviso require?
Two things, and they are cumulative. The act done must (1) have been a probable consequence of the abetment, AND (2) have been committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment. The word joining them is 'and', not 'or'. The first is an objective question about foreseeability; the second is a causal question linking the act done back to the particular form of abetment that occurred, tracking the three limbs of abetment in Section 45. Illustration (a) is written in conditional form precisely because neither condition is automatic. S1
+Which illustration matters most?
Illustration (b), because it refuses liability and so marks the boundary. B does exactly what he was told - burns the house - and also commits a theft while there. A 'is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning'. Two lessons follow: an act that merely happens at the same time and place as the abetted act is not thereby a probable consequence of it, and liability is parcelled out act by act, so A remains 'guilty of abetting the burning of the house'. S1
+How is illustration (c) different from illustration (b)?
It is the same line seen from the other side. In (c), men are sent armed to break into an inhabited house at midnight for robbery and kill an inmate who resists; the illustration says that if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is 'liable to the punishment provided for murder'. The contrast with (b) is between an act that merely occurred during the enterprise and an act that flowed from its nature. S1
+How is Section 51 different from Section 50?
By what diverged. Section 50 applies where the same act was done but with a different intention or knowledge, and it needs no proviso because the act is the one the abettor asked for - his own intention can safely supply the measure. Section 51 applies where a different act altogether was done, and it needs a proviso because the conduct itself has changed; without a limit the abettor would answer for whatever the doer chose to do. S1
+What is the punishment under Section 51?
Section 51 fixes none. It says the abettor is liable 'in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted' the act done, which routes the question back to whichever punishment provision then applies. Illustration (c) shows the mechanism by referring to A being 'liable to the punishment provided for murder' rather than to any term in Section 51 itself. S1
+Why is Section 51 missing from the Section 2(24)(a) list that widens 'offence'?
Because it has no 'offence' to widen. Running the numbers 49 to 61 against that list one by one, every provision is listed except Sections 51 and 53 - and those two are precisely the only ones in the range whose text never uses the word 'offence' at all. Section 51 speaks throughout of an 'act' being abetted and a 'different act' being done; Section 53 is about 'an effect caused by act abetted'. They attribute liability for acts and effects, leaving the question of what offence that liability amounts to - and therefore the meaning of 'offence' - to the provision under which the abettor is finally punished. The correlation is a verified fact; the explanation is the article's analysis, and no legislative material on it was located. S1
+What changed from IPC Section 111?
One word. The operative sentence is identical, and the proviso is identical except that the Sanhita reads 'Provided that the act done was a probable consequence ...' where the Penal Code read 'Provided the act done was ...'. Both forms were confirmed from the primary texts. All three illustrations are carried over in the same order with the same labels and unchanged substance. Anyone presenting Section 51 as a change in the law of abettor's liability has misread it. S1S4
+Are there any other textual differences from the IPC version?
Two commas, and their status is genuinely uncertain. The Sanhita's text has a comma at 'Here, if the child' in illustration (a) and at 'burn Z's house, B sets fire' in illustration (b), where the India Code text of IPC Section 111 has none. It cannot be determined from these sources whether the Sanhita's drafters added them or the India Code extraction of the Penal Code dropped them. The point is recorded rather than resolved, and nothing turns on it. S1S4
+Has any court applied Section 51 under the Sanhita?
No. A phrase search for 'section 51 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita' is a genuine nil - the retrieved page carries the literal text 'No matching results' and contains zero result entries, verified by retrieving the page itself because the search tool returned an ambiguous count. No judgment applying, interpreting or even citing Section 51 was located. Penal Code decisions on Section 111 remain directly relevant because the operative sentence is unchanged. S9
+What do the located Penal Code cases say?
Less than one might hope. In Shrawan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Rajasthan High Court, 6 January 2023) the Court set out IPC Section 111 in full including its proviso, and observed of Section 107 that 'an act of abetment may take place in one of the three ways; namely, instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid' and that 'It thus requires the commission of positive act' - a statement of the statutory scheme, not an application of Section 111 to the facts. In Sunilkumar v. The State of Karnataka (Karnataka High Court, Kalaburagi Bench, 14 August 2026) the Court recorded that 'Section 111 deals with the liability of the abettor when one act was abetted, and a different act was done', which is a descriptive restatement rather than an application; that case concerned IPC Sections 494 and 495. No decision turning on the Section 51 proviso was located, and none was found testing where illustration (b)'s line falls in a contested case. S7S8S9
+Is there anything odd about the official text of Section 51?
One extraction defect, and it is the second instance of exactly the same fault in this chapter. The India Code text renders the illustrations heading as 'llustrations.' without its initial letter; the Gazette text published by the Ministry of Home Affairs reads 'Illustrations.' and that is the correct form. Section 49 carries the identical defect. S1S2
+Is there a numbering trap with Section 51?
Yes. BNSS Section 51 concerns examination of an arrested person by a medical practitioner, and BSA Section 51 concerns facts judicially noticeable. An abbreviated reference to 'Section 51 of the BNS' in an order may mean one of those rather than this provision, so check the subject matter before treating any such citation as a Section 51 case. S5S6

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 2 October 2026)
  2. S2India Code — The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 51 (Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done) (accessed 2 October 2026)
  3. S3Ministry of Home Affairs Notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II—Section 3—Sub-section (ii), No. 811, 24 February 2024 (CG-DL-E-24022024-252353) (accessed 2 October 2026)
  4. S4India Code — The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act No. 45 of 1860) (accessed 2 October 2026)
  5. S5The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 46 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 2 October 2026)
  6. S6The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act No. 47 of 2023) — The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 1, as published by the Ministry of Home Affairs (accessed 2 October 2026)
  7. S7Shrawan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 3716/2022, order dated 6 January 2023 (Pushpendra Singh Bhati J.) (accessed 9 October 2026)
  8. S8Sunilkumar v. The State of Karnataka, High Court of Karnataka, Kalaburagi Bench, Criminal Petition No. 201695 of 2023 with Criminal Petition No. 201313 of 2024, order dated 14 August 2026 (H.P. Sandesh J.) (accessed 9 October 2026)
  9. S9Indian Kanoon phrase searches for "section 51 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita" and "When an act is abetted and a different act is done" (retrieved search pages and result listings) (accessed 9 October 2026)

Related deep dives

← All BNS section deep dives