Overview and Doctrinal Foundation of Constructive Liability
In criminal trials involving mob violence or group attacks, it is often impossible to prove which specific individual struck the fatal blow. Section 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) (which directly replaces the celebrated Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)) solves this evidentiary challenge by fastening constructive (vicarious) substantive liability on every person who is a member of an unlawful assembly at the time an offence is committed by any member S1, s. 190; S3, s. 149; S5.
Unlike Section 3(5) BNS (common intention, formerly Section 34 IPC), which is merely a rule of evidence, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Section 149 IPC (now Section 190 BNS) creates a specific and distinct substantive head of criminal liability (Madan Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 4 SCC 622) S7. Therefore, a trial court should frame a distinct charge reading the substantive offence (e.g., Section 103 BNS for murder) with Section 190 BNS S1, s. 103, s. 190; S7.
Statutory Text and the Two Distinct Limbs of Liability
Section 190 BNS states:
"If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence." S1, s. 190; S3, s. 149
In the landmark judgment of Mizaji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 572, the Supreme Court analysed the anatomy of this provision and established that it consists of two distinct limbs S6:
1. First Limb: Offence Committed "In Prosecution of the Common Object"
The phrase "in prosecution of the common object" does not mean "during the prosecution of the common object"; rather, it means "in order to attain the common object" S6. When an offence is directly committed to achieve the shared common object of the assembly (for example, five persons form an unlawful assembly with the common object of killing V, and one of them shoots V), every member is directly liable under the First Limb S1, s. 190; S6.
2. Second Limb: Offence "Such as the Members Knew to be Likely to be Committed in Prosecution of That Object"
Even if the common object of the unlawful assembly was a lesser act (for example, forcibly taking possession of disputed agricultural land under Section 189(1)(d) BNS), if the members went armed with firearms, spears, and lathis to overcome expected resistance, they knew that murder or grievous hurt was likely to be committed in prosecuting that land-grabbing object S1, s. 190; S6. Here:
- The word "knew" imports a higher threshold than a mere remote possibility; it requires positive objective awareness that the collateral offence is likely to be committed given the weapons carried, the nature of the assembly, and the surrounding behaviour before and at the scene (Mizaji v. State of U.P.) S6.
3. Temporal Requirement: Membership "At the Time of the Committing of That Offence"
Vicarious liability attaches only to a person who is a member of the same assembly at the time the offence is committed S1, s. 190. If a person was initially part of the unlawful assembly but genuinely disassociated and withdrew from the assembly before the offence was committed, or arrived only after the offence had already ended, they cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 190 BNS S1, s. 190; S5.
Key Judicial Authorities and Evidentiary Safeguards
1. Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 202 (Four-Judge Bench)
The Supreme Court rejected the defence argument that the prosecution must prove a specific individual overt act by every single member of an unlawful assembly to invoke Section 149 IPC (now Section 190 BNS): once it is proved that a person was a member of the unlawful assembly sharing its common object, an overt act by each individual is not a legal prerequisite S5. However, as a rule of judicial prudence in large crowd / faction cases involving many accused, courts look for corroboration by at least two or more reliable witnesses identifying an accused's presence and participation in the unlawful assembly so that innocent bystanders are not roped in S5.
2. Mizaji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 572
Five armed persons went to forcibly plough a disputed field in the possession of the complainants; when the complainants protested, one member (Mizaji) fired a pistol killing the victim S6. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of all five members under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, holding that when people go armed with lethal weapons to enforce a supposed right over land and are prepared to overcome resistance, all members know that murder is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object S6.
3. Madan Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 4 SCC 622
The Court reiterated that "common object" (Section 149 IPC / Section 190 BNS) is wider in reach than "common intention" (Section 34 IPC / Section 3(5) BNS): common intention requires a prior meeting of minds and active participation in the criminal act, whereas common object requires only that the accused be a member of an assembly of five or more persons sharing one of the five objects in Section 189(1) BNS S7.
IPC-to-BNS Comparison Table
| Feature | IPC Section 149 (1860) | BNS Section 190 (2023) | Legal Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Section Number | Section 149 (Chapter VIII) S3 | Section 190 (Chapter XI) S1 | Renumbered immediately after Section 189 (Unlawful assembly) S1; S3. |
| Operative Text | Two-limb constructive liability rule for members of an unlawful assembly S3 | Identical verbatim text S1 | All Supreme Court precedents under IPC Section 149 (Masalti, Mizaji, Madan Singh) apply with full force to BNS Section 190 S5; S6; S7. |
| Punishment & Procedure | Same as for the substantive offence committed S3 | Same as for the substantive offence committed S1; S4 | Unchanged S1; S3; S4. |
Punishment and Procedural Classification under BNSS
| Offence Branch | Punishment | Cognizability | Bailability | Triable Court |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object (Section 190 BNS) | The same as for the offence committed S1, s. 190; S4 | According as offence is cognizable or non-cognizable S4 | According as offence is bailable or non-bailable S4 | The court by which the offence is triable S4 |
Practical Examples and Counterexamples
Example 1: Armed Land Dispossession Resulting in Murder (Second Limb Applied)
Assumed Facts:Six men (A through F) form an unlawful assembly to take forcible possession of P's warehouse (Section 189(1)(d)). A carries a loaded country-made pistol openly at his waist, while B through F carry iron rods. When P's watchman refuses to hand over the keys, A shoots the watchman dead. B through F argue that they never intended murder, only forcible dispossession.
Legal Analysis: Because B through F marched with A knowing A carried a loaded firearm to overcome resistance during a forcible takeover, they knew that murder was likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object (Mizaji) S6. Under Section 103(1) read with Section 190 BNS, all six (A through F) are guilty of murder S1, s. 103, s. 190; S6.
Example 2: Isolated Unforeseeable Private Act by One Member (Counterexample)
Assumed Facts: Five unarmed students form an unlawful assembly to block a university gate and prevent the Vice-Chancellor's car from leaving (Section 189(1)(e)). While standing at the gate, one student S spots a personal rival walking past on the footpath, pulls out a concealed pocketknife that none of the other four students knew S possessed, and stabs the rival over a private debt.
Legal Analysis: The stabbing was neither done in prosecution of the common object of the assembly (blocking the VC's car) nor was it something the other four unarmed students knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. S alone is liable for the stabbing; the other four students are liable only for unlawful assembly/wrongful restraint, not for the stabbing under Section 190 BNS S1, s. 190; S6.