The short answer
Section 138 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is one sentence long, and it is the whole of the section: S1
"Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person."
That is a definition and nothing else. Section 138 prescribes no punishment. There is no sentence, no fine, no maximum, no First Schedule entry, no forum and no compounding position - because there is no offence here to classify. S1; S4
So abduction, by itself, is not a crime under the Sanhita. It becomes criminal only when some other section adds a purpose or a victim class to it - abducting in order that the person may be murdered, or abducting a woman to compel her marriage, and so on. Standing alone, section 138 creates no liability at all. S1; S7; S8; S9; S10
And yet the Sanhita treats abduction as grave enough to justify killing. Section 38 lists an assault with the intention of abducting among the descriptions in which the right of private defence of the body extends to voluntarily causing death. Conduct that is never punishable in itself may nonetheless be resisted with lethal force. S1; S6
Against the Penal Code the comparison is the shortest in this collection: nothing changed at all. S1; S2
A definition, not an offence - and it is verified four ways
This is the single most important thing to understand about section 138, so it is worth setting out how firmly it is established rather than merely asserting it. S1; S2; S4
First, the text. The section contains no penal words whatever - no "shall be punished", no "imprisonment", no "fine". It ends at "is said to abduct that person". S1
Second, the First Schedule. The Schedule to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita was probed directly for any entry keyed to section 138, including sub-section forms. There is none. S4
Third, the adjacency. The Schedule runs straight from the entry for 137(2) to the entry for 139(1), stepping over section 138 entirely: S4
"137(2) Kidnapping. Imprisonment for 7 years and fine. Cognizable. Bailable. Magistrate of the first class. 139(1) Kidnapping a child for ..."
Fourth, the predecessor. IPC section 362 was identical and likewise carried no punishment, sitting between section 361 (the definition of kidnapping from lawful guardianship) and section 363 (the punishment for kidnapping). S2
It follows that both Tables to section 359 are silent, and indeed the probe confirms section 138 appears in neither - there being no offence to compound. S4
The Schedule is not defective here. It lists offences, and a definition is not an offence. The same is true of section 137(1), which defines and carries no row either, while section 137(2), which punishes, does. S1; S4; S5
Against IPC section 362: no change whatever
| Operative text | identical, word for word |
| Marginal note | identical - "Abduction." in both |
| Punishment | none in either |
| State amendment | none recorded |
The token-level comparison returned zero differences. The marginal note was tested separately, as it must be because the comparison strips it, and it is identical too. S1; S2
This makes section 138 one of the purest instances of renumbering in the Sanhita - a provision carried across without the alteration of a single word, including its heading. Elsewhere in this group the Sanhita modernised a marginal note while leaving the operative text alone, or normalised spelling, or quietly changed a fine. Here it did nothing. S1; S2
The Gazette comparison likewise returned only two insertions, both the section number and the marginal note, so there is no divergence between the Gazette and the India Code text. S3
The Penal Code text was extracted through to the next section heading, which is where State amendment notes sit, and none is recorded against section 362. S2
The elements
Four things have to be established: S1
A means - and only one of two will do. Either the accused by force compels, or he by deceitful means induces. Those are the only two routes. Taking or enticing, which suffices for kidnapping from lawful guardianship, is not enough here unless it amounts to force or deceit. S1; S5
A result - the person goes. The words are "to go from any place". The person must actually be made to move. S1
Any person. There is no age limit and no requirement of unsound mind. An adult of full capacity may be abducted. S1
From any place. Not from India, and not from the keeping of a lawful guardian - from anywhere. S1
There is no consent element in terms, and none is needed: force and deceit are inconsistent with genuine consent, so the means requirement does the work that an express consent requirement does in section 137. S1; S5
Kidnapping and abduction are not the same thing
The Supreme Court addressed the distinction squarely in Somasundaram @ Somu v. State, 3 June 2020, in a judgment delivered by K.M. Joseph J. for a Bench of three. At paragraph 76 the Court set out section 362 and said: S11
"The offence of abduction is described in Section 362 of the IPC ... It is to be distinguished from kidnapping which is of two kinds as stated in Section 359 of the IPC, viz., kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. Both kidnapping and abducting, are referred to in Sections 364 and 365 of the IPC."
And at paragraph 79: S11
"It is clear that kidnapping differs from abduction. ... Abduction, as defined in Section 362 of the IPC, occurs when by force or deceitful means, a person is induced to go from any place. In this case, under Sections 364 and 365, though, it could be kidnapping and abduction, what is involved is abduction."
Note the Court's second sentence in paragraph 76. Its own illustration of where abduction operates is the aggravated sections - which is the structural point this article makes: abduction is encountered through other provisions, not on its own. S11
The differences, set out
| Kidnapping (s. 137) | Abduction (s. 138) | |
|---|---|---|
| Means | takes or entices; or conveys beyond India | force compels, or deceitful means induces |
| Victim | a child or person of unsound mind (guardianship limb); any person (India limb) | any person, any age |
| From where | out of India; or out of a lawful guardian's keeping | any place |
| Consent | expressly required - the person's, or the guardian's | not expressed; force and deceit negate it |
| Punishable by itself? | YES - s. 137(2), seven years and a mandatory fine | NO |
The last row is the one that matters most in practice. A charge may be laid under section 137(2) for kidnapping and nothing more. There is no equivalent charge for abduction. S1; S5
A judicial record of the age test the Sanhita abolished
One passage in Somasundaram is worth noting for a reason unconnected with abduction. Explaining kidnapping in 2020, the Court said: S11
"Kidnapping from lawful custody is occasioned if a male below 16 years or female below 18 years or person of unsound mind is taken out of custody of lawful guardian without his consent (Section 361)."
That is the Supreme Court stating the sex-differentiated age threshold four years before the Sanhita replaced it with a single under-eighteen test for every child. It is a convenient judicial record of what the law was, and of what section 137(1)(b) changed. S5; S11
The sections that give abduction teeth
Because section 138 is inert on its own, the practical question is always: which provision is being relied on? A scan of the whole Sanhita identifies every section that uses "abduct". S1; S6; S7; S8; S9; S10
| Section | What must be added to abduction | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| s. 87 | a woman, with intent or knowledge that she be compelled to marry against her will, or forced or seduced to illicit intercourse | up to 10 years + fine |
| s. 97 | a child under ten, with intent to take movable property dishonestly from the child's person | up to 7 years + fine |
| s. 140(1) | in order that the person may be murdered, or so disposed of as to be put in danger of murder | life, or rigorous imprisonment up to 10 years, + fine |
| s. 142 | knowing a person has been kidnapped or abducted, wrongfully conceals or confines them | punished as if he had kidnapped or abducted that person with the same intention or purpose |
| s. 113 | abduction as part of a terrorist act | (not examined here) |
| s. 143 | abduction as a means of trafficking | (not examined here) |
Two features of that list deserve comment.
***** The teeth are scattered across the Sanhita, not grouped with section 138. Sections 140, 142 and 143 sit in the same Chapter, but section 87 and section 97 are in earlier Chapters altogether, and section 113 is far earlier still. So a reader who turns to the kidnapping and abduction Chapter to find out when abduction is punishable will not find the full answer there. ***** S7; S8; S9; S10
Section 142 is structurally unusual. It does not prescribe a penalty of its own; it directs that the concealer be punished "in the same manner as if he had kidnapped or abducted such person with the same intention or knowledge, or for the same purpose". So its penalty is borrowed from whichever aggravated provision the underlying abduction answered to. It is the closest the Sanhita comes to penalising abduction as such, and even there it does so by reference. S10
Somasundaram also records that the aggravated provisions can overlap. At paragraph 81 the Court said it is "true that in a given case, a person may be abducted to be secretly and wrongfully confined and also to commit murder", and at paragraph 80 that the murder provision is "more graver" than the confinement provision. S11
The paradox: not punishable, yet a ground for killing
Section 38 of the Sanhita sets out when the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death. It is subject to the restrictions in section 37, and it applies where the offence occasioning the right is one of seven enumerated descriptions. The fifth is: S6
"(e) an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting"
So a person facing an assault made with intent to abduct him may, within section 37's limits, lawfully cause the assailant's death. S6
***** Set that beside section 138 and the contrast is striking: abduction attracts no punishment of its own, yet an assault with intent to commit it is one of the few situations in which the law permits a defender to kill. ***** S1; S6
The two positions are not inconsistent, and it is worth being precise about why. Section 38(e) is not triggered by abduction in the abstract. Its subject is an assault made with the intention of abducting - and assault is itself an offence under section 130. What section 38(e) recognises is the gravity of what the assailant is trying to achieve, not the punishability of abduction considered alone. The legislature's judgment is that being carried off by force or deceit is a serious enough prospect to justify extreme resistance, even though the carrying off is penalised only through the purpose-specific sections. S1; S6
Two limits on what is said here. Section 38's own operation, and the restrictions in section 37 that govern it, are not analysed in this article - they belong to those sections, which this collection has not yet reached. And no authority construing section 38(e) or its Penal Code equivalent was retrieved. S6
Practical distinctions and common misconceptions
"Abduction" is not a charge. A first information report or charge-sheet that alleges only abduction alleges no offence. The provision relied on must supply a purpose or a victim class. S1
Abduction is not confined to children. Any person of any age may be abducted. The age limits belong to kidnapping from lawful guardianship, not here. S1; S5
Force is not the only route. "Deceitful means" is an independent limb, so no violence need be shown where the person was induced to go by deceit. S1
Enticing a person away is not necessarily abduction. Enticement suffices for kidnapping from lawful guardianship; here the means must amount to force or deceit. S1; S5
The person must actually go. The words are "to go from any place". S1
Both kidnapping and abduction may be made out on the same facts, and the aggravated sections cover both - Somasundaram was decided on the footing that although the case "could be kidnapping and abduction, what is involved is abduction". S5; S11
There is nothing to compound, no cognizability or bailability to report, and no court designated to try section 138 - because it creates no offence. S4
Worked examples
Example 1. A points a weapon at Z and forces Z into a car. A has abducted Z within section 138. But no offence is yet made out under section 138 itself - the prosecution must identify a provision supplying a purpose. S1
Example 2. The same facts, and A's purpose was that Z be murdered. Section 140(1) - life imprisonment or rigorous imprisonment up to ten years, and a fine. S9
Example 3. A falsely tells Z that Z's child is in hospital, and Z travels to a place A has chosen. Deceitful means, so abduction - no force was used. Again, the purpose determines the offence. S1
Example 4. A abducts Z, a woman, intending that she be compelled to marry him. Section 87 - up to ten years and a fine. S7
Example 5. A abducts Z, a child of eight, meaning to take the gold chain from the child's neck. Section 97 - up to seven years and a fine. S8
Example 6. B, knowing Z has been abducted for ransom, hides Z in his house. Section 142 - and B is punished as if he had abducted Z with that same purpose. S10
Example 7. A assaults Z intending to carry Z off by force. Z, within the restrictions in section 37, causes A's death in resisting. Section 38(e) applies, and Z's act may fall within the right of private defence - even though A's intended abduction would not by itself have been punishable. S1; S6
Example 8. A persuades Z, a boy of fifteen, to leave his father's house by promising him work, using neither force nor deceit as to the departure. This is unlikely to be abduction, but it may well be kidnapping from lawful guardianship under section 137(1)(b), which is punishable under section 137(2). S1; S5
Commencement and which law applies
Section 138 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S12
For this section the date makes no difference at all. The definition is word-for-word identical to IPC section 362, carried no punishment then and carries none now. Whether conduct occurred before or after 1 July 2024, the meaning of abduction is the same. S1; S2; S12
The date may matter to the provision actually charged, since the aggravated sections carry their own penalties and their own histories. That is a question for those sections. S7; S8; S9; S10
Related provisions worth reading alongside section 138
- Section 137 - kidnapping: the neighbouring definition, which unlike this one is punishable in its own right. S5
- Section 38 - the right of private defence of the body extending to causing death, which lists an assault with intent to abduct. S6
- Sections 87, 97, 140 and 142 - four of the provisions that make abduction criminal. S7; S8; S9; S10
Sources and honest limits
The section text was read from the verified section inventory and checked against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita, where the comparison returned only the section number and marginal note. The comparison with IPC section 362 was made by token-level analysis with page artefacts and amendment brackets removed, with the marginal note tested separately, and the Penal Code text was extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note. The absence of a First Schedule entry was established by an express negative probe for section 138 in all sub-section forms, and corroborated by reading the 137(2) to 139(1) adjacency; both Tables to section 359 were probed within bounded ranges. The sections that use "abduct" were identified by scanning the text of every section in the inventory, and the texts of sections 38, 87, 97, 137, 140 and 142 were read from it. The judgment was retrieved in full and its identity, reasoning and paragraph numbering read from inside the document. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6; S7; S8; S9; S10; S11
What this article does not establish:
- NO AUTHORITY WAS FOUND FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT ABDUCTION IS A "CONTINUING OFFENCE" while kidnapping is complete on the taking. That contrast is commonly stated, and two searches were run for it, but the word "continuing" does not appear in the judgment retrieved and no decision supporting the proposition was obtained. It is therefore not asserted anywhere in this article.
- NO DECISION CONSTRUING "FORCE COMPELS" OR "DECEITFUL MEANS" IN ISOLATION WAS LOCATED. Somasundaram states the definition and distinguishes abduction from kidnapping, but does not analyse either limb. A search confined to section 362 returned thirty results, none of them Supreme Court decisions, and they were not relied on.
- SOMASUNDARAM IS CITED FOR ITS EXPOSITION OF THE STATUTORY SCHEME, NOT AS A DECISION ON SECTION 362. The appeal concerned convictions under the aggravated provisions and for murder. The passages relied on are the Court's own analysis at paragraphs 76 and 79 to 81, and are distinguished from the extensive passages elsewhere in the report recording counsel's contentions, from which nothing is taken. The disposal of the appeal was not read and nothing is said about it.
- SECTION 38 IS NOT ANALYSED. Its operation, and the restrictions in section 37 to which it is expressly subject, belong to those sections, which this collection has not yet reached. No authority on section 38(e) or its Penal Code equivalent was retrieved, and the reading of the contrast between section 38(e) and section 138 as a deliberate legislative judgment is this article's own.
- SECTIONS 87, 97, 113, 140, 142 AND 143 ARE CITED FOR THEIR TEXT ONLY. Their elements, their IPC mappings and their own procedural classifications are not examined. In particular section 140 appears to have more than one sub-section and its full scope is not established here, and sections 113 and 143 are noted only as further provisions in which abduction features.
- WHETHER ANY BNS PROVISION CORRESPONDS TO IPC SECTION 365 - kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine, which Somasundaram discusses alongside section 364 - was not established. The scan identified the sections using "abduct" but did not map them to their Penal Code predecessors.
- "CONSENT" IS STILL NOT DEFINED IN THIS COLLECTION. It is not an element of section 138 in terms, which is why the point is not pressed here, but the observation that force and deceit negate consent is this article's own reasoning rather than a cited rule.
- No Law Commission search was run for this section, and nothing was retrieved explaining why the Sanhita left the definition untouched.
- Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.
Section 138 is the shortest provision this collection has examined and the one least changed - a single sentence carried across from the Penal Code without the alteration of a word, marginal note included. Its importance lies entirely in what it does not do. It creates no offence, so it attracts no sentence, no classification, no forum and no compounding position, and the First Schedule steps over it; a charge of abduction and nothing more is no charge at all. What makes the section worth close attention is the gap between that inertness and the seriousness the Sanhita plainly attaches to the conduct: six other provisions build offences on abduction, carrying penalties up to imprisonment for life, and they are scattered across the Sanhita rather than gathered beside the definition - so the reader who looks only at this Chapter will miss two of them. And section 38 goes further still, numbering an assault with intent to abduct among the few situations in which a defender may lawfully kill. Conduct that is never punishable on its own may nonetheless be resisted to the death. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.