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BNS Section 144 · Deep dive

BNS Section 144: Exploitation of a Trafficked Person - a Lower Mental Element, Higher Maxima, and a Drafting Error Repaired

Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the demand-side counterpart to section 143: where that section punishes the trafficker, this punishes whoever makes use of the victim. It has two sub-sections. The first covers a person who, knowing or having reason to believe that a child has been trafficked, engages that child for sexual exploitation in any manner, and carries rigorous imprisonment of not less than five years rising to ten, with a mandatory fine. The second covers the same conduct as to any person and carries not less than three years rising to seven. Three features stand out. The mental element is low: having reason to believe is enough, so deliberate incuriosity is no defence - and that is a lighter burden than section 142 imposes on a charge of concealing a kidnapped person, which requires actual knowledge. The Sanhita raised both maxima while leaving both minima alone, taking the ceiling from seven years to ten for a child and from five to seven for any other person, so courts gained room at the top without any change at the entry point. And the section is confined to sexual exploitation, although section 143's Explanation 1 defines exploitation far more widely to include servitude, slavery, beggary and forced removal of organs - so that wide definition does not carry through to the demand side. The Sanhita also quietly repaired a drafting error that had stood in the Penal Code since 2013, deleting a stray 'by' from the second sub-section's opening words. 'Minor' became 'child', but because IPC section 370A used 'minor' without defining it, no change in the protected age is asserted. Both offences are cognizable, non-bailable, not compoundable and triable by the Court of Session, and both Schedule entries are correct.

By the Nyaya Yantra Editorial TeamLaw checked as of 15 October 2026 22 min read

Prepared with AI-assisted research from the official sources listed at the end of this article.

At a glance

Provision
BNS Section 144 — Exploitation of a trafficked person
Earlier law (IPC)
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 370A · direct
Side-by-side converterIPC 370A → BNS 144

The short answer

Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes the person at the demand end of trafficking - the one who uses a trafficked victim. It has two sub-sections, graded by the victim's age: S1

"(1) Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe that a child has been trafficked, engages such child for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

(2) Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked, engages such person for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."

Three things are worth taking from it immediately.

***** The mental element is low. "Knowingly or having reason to believe" means actual knowledge is not required - constructive knowledge suffices. That is a lower standard than section 142 applies to a person who conceals a kidnapped victim, which requires actual knowledge. ***** S1; S8

***** The Sanhita raised both maxima. IPC section 370A allowed seven years for a child and five for an adult; section 144 allows ten and seven. The minima were left alone. ***** S1; S2

***** And it corrected a drafting error. IPC section 370A(2) read "Whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe" - ungrammatical, and carried that way since 2013. The Sanhita deleted the stray "by". ***** S1; S2

What changed from IPC section 370A

The comparison returns five differences, and four of them are substantive: S1; S2

IPC s. 370ASection 144
Victim, sub-s. (1)a "minor"a "child"
Sentence, sub-s. (1)5 to 7 years5 to 10 years
Sentence, sub-s. (2)3 to 5 years3 to 7 years
Sub-s. (2) opening"knowingly by or having reason to believe""knowingly or having reason to believe"
Minima5 and 3 years5 and 3 years - unchanged

S1; S2

The marginal note is identical in both - "Exploitation of a trafficked person" - tested separately, as it must be because the comparison strips it. S1; S2

Everything else came across untouched: the mental element, "engages ... for sexual exploitation in any manner", the requirement of rigorous imprisonment, and the mandatory fine in both sub-sections. S1; S2

The maxima, and what the change does

Both ceilings rose while both floors stayed put. S1; S2

  • Sub-section (1): the range widened from two years (5 to 7) to five years (5 to 10).
  • Sub-section (2): from two years (3 to 5) to four years (3 to 7).

So the Sanhita gave sentencing courts substantially more room at the top in both cases, without raising the entry point for either. A first-time offender at the bottom of the range faces what he would have faced under the Penal Code; an offender at the top faces considerably more. S1; S2

Nothing retrieved explains the increase, and no purpose is attributed. S1; S2

The corrected error

IPC section 370A(2) opened: "Whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe that a person has been trafficked". The word "by" has no function there and makes the phrase ungrammatical. Section 144(2) omits it. S1; S2

The error stood in the Penal Code from 2013 until 1 July 2024, sub-section (1) having been drafted correctly throughout, so the Sanhita's version simply brings the second sub-section into line with the first. S1; S2

No change of meaning is asserted - the correction removes a stray word rather than altering the standard, which was and is "knowingly or having reason to believe". S1; S2

The age term, and a deliberate abstention

"Minor" became "child" in sub-section (1). This is the fourth time this collection has met that substitution. S1; S2; S7

And for the second time the predecessor's age cannot be established. IPC section 370A used "minor" without defining it - the section was read in full and carries no definition and no Explanation - exactly as IPC section 370 did. S2

So the position is the same as at section 143: S1; S2; S7

  • What section 144 protects is certain. "Child" is defined by section 2(3) as any person below eighteen years.
  • What IPC section 370A's "minor" imported is not established, so this article does not assert that the protected age changed, or that it did not.

That distinguishes these two sections from sections 137 and 139, where the Penal Code stated its ages expressly - sixteen for a male, eighteen for a female - and the change could therefore be measured. S1

The mental element, and why it is lower than section 142's

This section and section 142 both impose liability on a person who did not commit the underlying offence. They apply different standards, and the difference is worth seeing. S1; S8

Section 142 - concealing a kidnapped personSection 144 - exploiting a trafficked person
Mental element"knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has been abducted""knowingly or having reason to believe that a child has been trafficked"
Standardactual knowledgeactual or constructive knowledge

S1; S8

***** So a person who merely had reason to believe the victim was trafficked is liable under section 144, whereas a person who merely had reason to believe the victim was kidnapped is not liable under section 142. ***** S1; S8

The practical significance is obvious: a brothel-keeper or employer who deliberately avoids asking questions is within section 144's reach, while the same wilful blindness would not satisfy section 142. S1; S8

Three limits. The contrast is drawn from the words of the two sections and no authority construing either standard was retrieved. The reading of "having reason to believe" as covering wilful blindness is this article's own and is offered as the natural sense rather than a settled construction. And the Sanhita did not create the difference - both formulations came across from the Penal Code unchanged. S1; S2; S8

The elements

That the victim has been trafficked. Trafficking takes its meaning from section 143(1), so the prosecution must establish conduct answering that definition - a purpose of exploitation, one of five conduct verbs, and one of six means. S1; S6

Knowledge or reason to believe that this is so. S1

Engaging the victim for sexual exploitation in any manner. The words "in any manner" are deliberately wide. S1

A child, for sub-section (1); any person, for sub-section (2). The two sub-sections are otherwise identical in structure. S1

Note what is not required. The accused need not have trafficked the victim, need not have dealt with any trafficker, and need not have known who did it. This is a demand-side offence, directed at the person who makes use of the victim. S1

And note one point about scope. Section 144 is confined to sexual exploitation, although section 143's Explanation 1 defines exploitation much more widely - to include servitude, slavery, beggary and forced removal of organs. So engaging a trafficked person for forced labour is not within section 144, and whether any other provision reaches it was not examined here. S1; S6

Section 143's Explanation 2 provides that the victim's consent is immaterial "in determination of the offence of trafficking". S6

Section 144 contains no equivalent provision. S1

Two observations, both offered as readings rather than conclusions. Explanation 2 is expressed to apply to "the offence of trafficking", which is section 143's offence, so on its face it does not travel to section 144. But section 144 requires proof that the person "has been trafficked", and that question is determined under section 143 - where Explanation 2 does apply. So the victim's consent appears to be excluded on the trafficking element while nothing expressly addresses it on the exploitation element. S1; S6

No authority on this was located and the point is not resolved here. It is flagged because it is the kind of question that would arise directly in practice. S1; S6

Classification and forum

Two Schedule rows, both to the Court of Session

The First Schedule was probed for each sub-section separately and the rows read in their raw column layout: S4

Offence describedPunishment columnCognizable?Bailable?Triable by
144(1)"Exploitation of a trafficked child""Rigorous imprisonment for not less than 5 years but which may extend to 10 years and fine"CognizableNon-bailableCourt of Session
144(2)"Exploitation of a trafficked person""Rigorous imprisonment for not less than 3 years but which may extend to 7 years and fine"CognizableNon-bailableCourt of Session

S4

Both entries reproduce the section's minima and maxima accurately, which is worth noting: elsewhere in this Chapter the Schedule has flattened ceilings into single figures. S1; S4

Neither offence is compoundable - section 144 appears in neither Table to section 359, both probed within bounded ranges. S4

The forum entries are correct

Under section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita a Magistrate of the first class may pass three years and a Chief Judicial Magistrate any sentence not exceeding seven. S5

Sub-section (1), with a ten-year maximum, is beyond both. Sub-section (2), with a seven-year maximum, is beyond a Magistrate of the first class. So the Court of Session is right for each. S1; S4; S5

This is worth recording, because sub-section (2) was the one to watch. A three-to-seven-year offence sits exactly on the dividing line this collection identified at section 140 - where offences at or below seven years were being assigned to a Magistrate of the first class whose power is three, producing four-year shortfalls at sections 137(2) and 140(3). Section 144(2) could easily have gone the same way. It did not. S4; S5

So this Chapter's forum record now stands at: three defective entries - sections 137(2), 139(1) and 140(3) - against eleven correct ones, the six in section 143 and these two having all been assigned properly. S4; S5

How the courts have applied IPC section 370A

No authority is relied on. No decision construing section 370A was retrieved for this section, which is consistent with what this collection found at section 143, where no Supreme Court authority on the trafficking provision itself could be obtained. S1; S2

So nothing is said here about what "engages ... for sexual exploitation in any manner" covers, what suffices for "having reason to believe", whether the trafficking must be proved to the criminal standard before this section bites, or how the two sub-sections interact where the victim's age is disputed. Those questions are open on the material retrieved, and this article's account of the section is an account of its text. S1

Practical distinctions and common misconceptions

This is a demand-side offence. It catches the user of a trafficked person, not the trafficker - that is section 143. S1; S6

Actual knowledge is not required. "Having reason to believe" is enough, so deliberate incuriosity is no defence. S1

That is a lower threshold than section 142 applies to a person concealing a kidnapped victim. S1; S8

Only sexual exploitation is covered. Engaging a trafficked person for forced labour, servitude or beggary falls outside section 144, even though section 143 treats all of those as exploitation. S1; S6

"In any manner" is wide, so the form the sexual exploitation takes is not confined. S1

Both maxima are higher than under the Penal Code - ten years rather than seven for a child, seven rather than five for an adult - but the minima are unchanged. S1; S2

Both sub-sections carry statutory minima, so a court cannot go below five years for a child or three for any other person. S1

Both are cognizable, non-bailable, not compoundable and triable only by the Court of Session. S4

Trafficking must still be established under section 143's definition; section 144 does not define it. S1; S6

Worked examples

Example 1. A runs a brothel and takes in Z, a woman he knows was brought there by traffickers. Section 144(2) - minimum three years, up to seven. S1

Example 2. The same facts, but A does not know and asks nothing, in circumstances that would plainly have put a reasonable person on notice. "Having reason to believe" may be satisfied, and on that footing section 144(2) applies. No authority on the standard was retrieved. S1

Example 3. The same facts, but Z is sixteen. Section 144(1) - minimum five years, up to ten. S1; S7

Example 4. A engages Z, whom he knows to have been trafficked, as an unpaid domestic worker, with no sexual element. Section 144 does not apply, being confined to sexual exploitation - although Z's trafficking for servitude is within section 143's Explanation 1. Whether another provision reaches A was not examined. S1; S6

Example 5. A had reason to believe Z had been kidnapped rather than trafficked, and conceals her. Section 142 requires actual knowledge, so reason to believe would not suffice there - the opposite of the position under section 144. S1; S8

Example 6. A is convicted under section 144(1) and the court considers two years appropriate. It cannot pass that sentence - the statutory minimum is five years. S1

Commencement and which law applies

Section 144 commenced on 1 July 2024, under Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024. S9

***** The date is decisive at the top of each range. ***** For conduct before 1 July 2024, IPC section 370A governs, and under it the maximum was seven years where a minor was exploited and five where any other person was - against ten and seven now. Since the Sanhita is heavier at the ceiling in both sub-sections, earlier conduct falls to be dealt with under the Penal Code provision. S1; S2; S9

At the bottom of each range the date makes no difference, the minima of five and three years being identical under both. S1; S2

And the age term changed, though as explained above whether that produces any difference in the protected age is not established. S1; S2; S7

  • Section 143 - trafficking, which supplies the meaning of "trafficked" and whose Explanation 1 defines exploitation far more widely than this section reaches. S6
  • Section 142 - concealing a kidnapped person, for the contrast in mental element. S8
  • Section 2(3) - the definition of "child". S7

Sources and honest limits

The section text was read from the verified section inventory and compared token by token against the Gazette publication of the Sanhita, where the only differences were the section number and fragments of the marginal note. The comparison with IPC section 370A was made by token-level analysis with amendment brackets and page artefacts removed first, and the marginal note was tested separately; the Penal Code section was read in full to establish whether it defined "minor", and the text was extracted through to the next section heading to catch any State amendment note. The First Schedule was probed for each sub-section separately and both rows read in their raw column layout, and both Tables to section 359 were probed within bounded ranges. Section 23 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita was read for the forum arithmetic, and sections 2(3), 142 and 143 from the inventory. S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6; S7; S8

What this article does not establish:

  • NO AUTHORITY ON IPC SECTION 370A WAS RETRIEVED AND NONE IS RELIED ON. So nothing is said about what "engages ... for sexual exploitation in any manner" covers, what suffices for "having reason to believe", whether the trafficking must be proved to the criminal standard before this section bites, or how the sub-sections interact where the victim's age is disputed. This article's account of the section is an account of its text.
  • ***** WHAT "MINOR" MEANT IN IPC SECTION 370A IS NOT ESTABLISHED. The section was read in full and carries no definition and no Explanation, exactly as IPC section 370 did. So although section 144 protects a "child" - certainly under eighteen by section 2(3) - this article does NOT assert that the protected age changed, or that it did not. That is the same deliberate abstention taken at section 143, and it distinguishes both from sections 137 and 139. *****
  • NOTHING EXPLAINS THE INCREASE IN EITHER MAXIMUM. That the ceiling rose from seven years to ten in sub-section (1) and from five to seven in sub-section (2), while both minima were left unchanged, is verified from the two texts. Why is not established and no travaux or Law Commission material was retrieved.
  • THE CONTRAST WITH SECTION 142'S MENTAL ELEMENT IS DRAWN FROM THE WORDS OF THE TWO SECTIONS. No authority construing either standard was retrieved, and the reading of "having reason to believe" as covering wilful blindness is this article's own, offered as the natural sense rather than a settled construction. Note also that the Sanhita did not create the difference - both formulations came across unchanged.
  • THE CORRECTION OF "knowingly by or having reason to believe" IS REPORTED AS THE REMOVAL OF A STRAY WORD. No change of meaning is asserted, and nothing retrieved explains when or why the error entered the Penal Code beyond its presence in the text as substituted.
  • WHETHER SECTION 143'S EXPLANATION 2 REACHES SECTION 144 IS NOT RESOLVED. The article sets out the difficulty - that Explanation 2 is expressed to apply to "the offence of trafficking" while section 144 requires proof that the person "has been trafficked" - and flags it as unresolved, no authority having been located.
  • SECTION 144 IS CONFINED TO SEXUAL EXPLOITATION while section 143's Explanation 1 is far wider. Whether any provision reaches a person who engages a trafficked victim for forced labour, servitude or beggary was not examined.
  • SECTIONS 142, 143 AND 2(3) ARE CITED FOR COMPARISON AND FOR THE DEFINED TERMS ONLY. Their own elements are not re-examined here.
  • THE PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF NON-BAILABILITY AND COGNIZABILITY are stated but not worked through.
  • No Law Commission search was run, and no State variation to either First Schedule entry was checked.
  • Dates. Law checked as of the date in the article metadata. Later decisions, and any amendment to the Sanhita, are not reflected.

Section 144 is the counterpart to section 143 and the shorter of the pair: where section 143 punishes the trafficker, this punishes whoever makes use of the victim. Three features repay attention. Its mental element is deliberately low - "having reason to believe" is enough, so the employer or keeper who takes care not to ask is caught, and that is a lighter burden on the prosecution than section 142 imposes on a charge of concealing a kidnapped person, which demands actual knowledge. Its penalties were raised at the ceiling and only at the ceiling, from seven years to ten where a child is exploited and from five to seven for any other person, so the Sanhita widened the court's room at the top while leaving the entry point alone. And it is confined to sexual exploitation, which means the wide definition of exploitation that section 143 uses - reaching servitude, slavery, beggary and the removal of organs - does not carry through to the demand side of this one offence. The Sanhita also quietly repaired a drafting error that had sat in the Penal Code since 2013, deleting a stray "by" from the second sub-section's opening words. And both Schedule entries are correct, which in this Chapter is worth saying. Verify the current text, and take advice on your own facts, before acting.

Frequently asked questions

+What does BNS Section 144 punish?
Engaging a trafficked person for sexual exploitation in any manner, where the accused knew or had reason to believe that the person had been trafficked. Sub-section (1) deals with a child and carries five to ten years; sub-section (2) deals with any person and carries three to seven. Both carry a mandatory fine and both require rigorous imprisonment.
+How is this different from Section 143?
Section 143 punishes the trafficker - the person who recruits, transports, harbours, transfers or receives the victim. Section 144 punishes the user at the other end. The accused under section 144 need not have trafficked the victim, dealt with any trafficker, or known who did it.
+Does the prosecution have to prove the accused knew?
No. The words are 'knowingly or having reason to believe', so constructive knowledge suffices and deliberate incuriosity is no defence. A keeper or employer who takes care not to ask is within reach.
+Is that the same standard as Section 142?
No, and the difference is sharp. Section 142 requires 'knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has been abducted' - actual knowledge. So a person who merely had reason to believe the victim was trafficked is liable under section 144, while a person who merely had reason to believe the victim was kidnapped is not liable under section 142.
+Did the Sanhita create that difference?
No. Both formulations came across from the Penal Code unchanged. And note that no authority construing either standard was retrieved - the contrast is drawn from the words of the two sections.
+What changed in the punishment?
Both maxima were raised and both minima left alone. Sub-section (1) went from five to seven years under IPC section 370A to five to ten; sub-section (2) from three to five to three to seven. So the court has more room at the top but the entry point is unchanged.
+Why were the maxima raised?
That is not established. The increase is verified from the two texts, but nothing retrieved explains it and no travaux or Law Commission material was obtained.
+Is there a minimum sentence?
Yes, in both sub-sections - five years where a child is exploited and three for any other person. A court cannot go below either.
+Does Section 144 cover forced labour?
No. It is confined to sexual exploitation. Section 143's Explanation 1 defines exploitation much more widely - including servitude, slavery, beggary and forced removal of organs - but that wide definition does not carry through to section 144. Whether another provision reaches a person who engages a trafficked victim for forced labour was not examined here.
+What does 'in any manner' add?
It is deliberately wide, so the form the sexual exploitation takes is not confined. No authority construing the phrase was retrieved.
+Did the Sanhita fix anything in this section?
Yes. IPC section 370A(2) read 'Whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe' - the word 'by' has no function there and makes the phrase ungrammatical. Section 144(2) omits it, bringing the sub-section into line with sub-section (1), which was drafted correctly throughout. The error had stood since 2013.
+Does the correction change the meaning?
No change of meaning is asserted. The standard was and remains 'knowingly or having reason to believe'; a stray word was removed.
+Who is a 'child' for Section 144(1)?
Any person below eighteen years, by section 2(3) of the Sanhita.
+Did the protected age change when 'minor' became 'child'?
That is not established and the article deliberately does not assert it either way. What section 144 protects is certain. But IPC section 370A was read in full and carries no definition of 'minor' and no Explanation, so there is no figure to compare against - exactly as at section 143.
+Must trafficking itself be proved?
Yes. Section 144 does not define 'trafficked' - it takes the meaning from section 143(1), so conduct answering that definition must be established: a purpose of exploitation, one of five conduct verbs, and one of six means.
+Is the victim's consent relevant?
Section 144 says nothing about consent. Section 143's Explanation 2 makes the victim's consent immaterial 'in determination of the offence of trafficking', and on its face that does not travel to section 144 - but section 144 requires proof that the person has been trafficked, and that question is determined under section 143 where the Explanation does apply. So consent appears excluded on the trafficking element while nothing expressly addresses it on the exploitation element. No authority was located and the point is not resolved.
+Are the Section 144 offences bailable?
Neither is. Both sub-sections are cognizable and non-bailable, and neither is compoundable - section 144 appears in neither Table to section 359.
+Which court tries these offences?
The Court of Session, for both sub-sections.
+Are those forum entries correct?
Yes. Sub-section (1)'s ten-year maximum is beyond both a Magistrate of the first class, capped at three years, and a Chief Judicial Magistrate, capped at seven. Sub-section (2)'s seven-year maximum is beyond a Magistrate of the first class. So the Court of Session is right for each.
+Was there a risk of a forum error here?
There was, and it is worth noting that it did not happen. A three-to-seven-year offence sits exactly on the dividing line that produced four-year shortfalls at sections 137(2) and 140(3), where offences at or below seven years were assigned to a Magistrate whose power is three. Section 144(2) could easily have gone the same way. The Chapter's record now stands at three defective entries against eleven correct ones.
+Does the Schedule state the punishments accurately?
Yes, and that is also worth noting. Both rows reproduce the minima and the maxima, unlike entries elsewhere in this Chapter which flattened a ceiling into a single figure.
+How have the courts applied IPC Section 370A?
No authority was retrieved and none is relied on, which is consistent with section 143 where no Supreme Court authority on the trafficking provision could be obtained either. So nothing is said about what 'engages ... for sexual exploitation in any manner' covers, what suffices for 'having reason to believe', or how the sub-sections interact where the victim's age is disputed.
+Which law applies to conduct before 1 July 2024?
IPC section 370A, because the Sanhita is heavier at the ceiling in both sub-sections - the maximum then being seven years for a minor and five for any other person. At the floor the date makes no difference, the minima being identical.
+Can a court impose less than the minimum in a sympathetic case?
Not on the face of the section. Both sub-sections say the sentence 'shall not be less than' the stated figure, so five years and three years respectively are statutory floors.

Sources

  1. S1The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), section 144 - Exploitation of a trafficked person — India Code, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  2. S2Indian Penal Code, 1860 - section 370A — India Code, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  3. S3The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act 45 of 2023), as published in the Gazette of India — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  4. S4The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023) - First Schedule and section 359 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  5. S5Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, section 23 - Sentences which Magistrates may pass — India Code, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  6. S6Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, section 143 - Trafficking of person — India Code, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  7. S7Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, section 2(3) - definition of 'child' — India Code, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  8. S8Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, section 142 - Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement, kidnapped or abducted person — India Code, Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)
  9. S9Ministry of Home Affairs notification S.O. 850(E) dated 23 February 2024 appointing 1 July 2024 for the commencement of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India (accessed 15 October 2026)

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